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Abstract: We investigate resilient control strategies for linear systems under Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks. By DoS attacks we mean interruptions of communication on measurement
(sensor-to-controller) and/or control (controller-to-actuator) channels carried out by an intelli-
gent adversary. We characterize the duration of these interruptions under which stability of the
closed-loop system is preserved. The resilient nature of the control descends from its ability to
adapt the sampling rate to the occurrence of the DoS.
Keywords: Cyber-physical systems; Digital control; Control under limited information;
Resilient control.
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a growing interest concern-
ing feedback control systems that are implemented over
communication networks. These networks impose that
measurements are acquired at discrete times, transmitted
and received by the controller. The latter processes the
received information and computes the control signal. This
can in turn be sampled and transmitted to the actuators.
Common limitations on these signals that travel over a net-
work are quantization, delays and loss of information. Due
to the limited bandwidth of the communication channel, as
well as possible constraints on the available computational
power, much research has been devoted to reduce the
use of the communication line, by designing the sampling
sequence based on current status of the process to control.
This has given raise to a very active line of research in
the context of event/self-triggering control; see Heemels,
Johansson, and Tabuada (2012) for a recent comprehensive
overview of the topic.
In the literature, several aspects of event/self-triggering
control have been investigated, including output-feedback
(Donkers and Heemels (2010)), robustness against additive
disturbances (Mazo Jr, Anta, and Tabuada (2010)), large-
scale systems (Wang and Lemmon (2011); De Persis,
Sailer, and Wirth (2013)) and distributed coordinated
control (Seyboth, Dimarogonas, and Johansson (2013);
De Persis and Frasca (2013)), to name a few. On the
other hand, an aspect of primary importance for which
less results are available is the robustness of such schemes
against malicious attacks.
Attacks to computer networks have become ever more
prevalent over the last few years. In this respect, one of
the (if not the) most common type of attack is the so-
called Denial-of-Service (DoS, for short); see Byres and
Lowe (2004) for an introduction to the topic. It consists
in a radio interference signal (also known as jamming
signal) which is primarily intended to affect the timeliness
of the information exchange, i.e. to cause packet losses.
While networked control formulations have previously con-
sidered sensor/control packet losses (Schenato, Sinopoli,
Franceschetti, Poolla, and Sastry (2007)), dealing with
DoS phenomena requires fundamentally different analysis
tools. In fact, in contrast with classical networked control
systems where packet losses can be reasonably modeled
as random events, assuming a stochastic characterization
of the DoS attacks would be inherently limiting in that it
would fail to capture the malicious and intelligent nature
of an attacker.
Prompted by these considerations, this paper discusses
the problem of controlling networked systems subject to
DoS attacks, whose underlying strategy is unknown. More
specifically, we consider a classical sampled-data control
system consisting of a continuous-time linear process in
feedback loop with a digital controller. An attacker, ac-
cording to some unknown strategy, can interrupt both sen-
sor and control communication channels. Under such cir-
cumstances, the process evolves under out-of-date control.
Within this context, we address the question of designing
control update rules that are capable of ensuring closed-
loop stability in the event that DoS does not occur too
frequently 1 . In this respect, the main contribution of this
paper is to show that suitable control update rules do exist
whenever the ratio between the “active” and “sleeping”
periods of jamming is small enough on the average. This
somehow reminds of stability problems for systems that
switch between stable and unstable modes; see e.g. Zhai,
Hu, Yasuda, and Michel (2000). In our paper, however, the
peculiarity of the problem under study leads to a different
analysis and results. We also show that the results here
introduced are flexible enough so as to allow the designer
to choose from several implementation options that can
be used to trade-off performance vs. communication re-
sources. Although these solutions originate from funda-
mentally different approaches, they exhibit the common
feature of resilience, by which we mean the possibility to
adapt the sampling rate to the DoS occurrence.
1 Clearly, in the case of a system that is open loop unstable, a DoS
that never allows the transmission of feedback information would
easily lead to instability.
Previous contributions to this research line have been
reported in Amin, Ca`rdenas, and Sastry (2009); Gupta,
Langbort, and Bas¸ar (2010). In these papers, however, the
framework is substantially different. They consider a pure
discrete-time setting in which the goal is to find optimal
control and attack strategies assuming a maximum num-
ber of jamming actions over a prescribed (finite) control
horizon. Here, we do not formulate the problem as an opti-
mal control design problem. The controller can be designed
according to any suitable design method, robustness and
resilience against DoS attacks being achieved thanks to
the design of the control update rule. Perhaps, the closest
references to our research is Foroush and Mart´ınez (2013).
In that paper, the authors consider a situation in which the
attack strategy is known to be periodic, though of unknown
period and duration. The goal is then to identify period
and duration of the jamming activity so as to determine
the time-intervals where communication is possible. Their
framework should be therefore looked at as complementary
more than alternative to the present one, since the former
deals with cases where one can adjust the control updates
so that they never fall into the jamming activity periods.
Such a feature is conceptually impossible to achieve in
scenarios such as the one considered in this paper, where
the jamming strategy is neither known nor prefixed (the
attacker can modify on-line the attack strategy).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we introduce the class of DoS signals which
are of interest in this paper and formulate the control
problem. The main result with a characterization of the
class of DoS signals under which stability is preserved
is given in Section 3. Section 4 discusses implementation
issues and presents a number of resilient control strategies.
In Appendix A, we report an alternative Lyapunov-based
treatment of the main result.
Proofs of the main result and the auxiliary lemmas are
reported in Appendix B.
2. FRAMEWORK AND PROBLEM OVERVIEW
The framework of interest can be schematically repre-
sented as in Figure 1. Specifically, we consider a remote
plant-operator setup, in which the process to be controlled
is described by the differential equation
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) (1)
where t ∈ R≥0; x ∈ R
nx is the state and u ∈ Rnu is
the control input; A and B are matrices of appropriate
size. We assume that a state-feedback matrix K has been
designed rendering the closed-loop system stable in the
sense of Lyapunov, i.e. such that all the eigenvalues of
A+BK have negative real part.
The control action is implemented via a sample-and-
hold device. Let {tk}, k ∈ N, t0 := 0 by convention,
represent the sequence of time instants at which it is
desired to update the control action. At the present stage,
for simplicity of exposition, we shall simply refer to the
“Logic” block as the device responsible for generating {tk}.
Accordingly, whatever the logic underlying this block, in
the ideal situation where data can be sent and received at
any desired instant of time, the control input applied to
the process is given by
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of the closed-loop system under DoS
on the communication channels.
uideal(t) = K x(tk), ∀ t ∈ [tk, tk+1[ (2)
We shall refer to Denial-of-Service (DoS, for short) as
the phenomenon that may prevent (2) from being applied
over certain time periods. In principle, such a phenomenon
can affect both control (controller-to-actuator) and mea-
surement (sensor-to-controller) channels. In this paper,
we consider the case of a DoS simultaneously affecting
both control and measurement channels. This amounts to
assuming that, in the presence of DoS, data can be neither
sent nor received. To make this concept precise, let {hn},
n ∈ N, h0 ≥ 0, represent the sequence of DoS positive
edge-triggering 2 and
Hn = [hn, hn + τn[ (3)
with τn > 0, the corresponding DoS n-th time-interval.
In this respect, we shall assume that over each Hn the
actuator generates an input that is based on the most
recently received control signal. Accordingly, let
n(t) =
{
−1, if t < h0
sup {n ∈ N | hn < t }, otherwise
(4)
denote the last (up to the current time) DoS positive edge-
triggering, and let
k(t) =


−1, if h0 = 0
and t ∈ H0
sup { k ∈ N | tk < t;
tk /∈
n(t)⋃
n=0
Hn

 , otherwise
(5)
denote the last (up to the current time) successful control
update. Then, the actual control input applied to the
process is given by
u(t) = K x(tk(t)) (6)
The possible presence of DoS also raises the question of
assigning a value for control input in case h0 = 0, i.e.
when communication is not possible at the process start-
up. In this respect, in case h0 = 0, we shall assume that
u(0) = 0 and let x(t−1) := 0 for notational consistency.
Remark 1. It would be possible to consider an alternative
framework in which the input to the process is always
2 Borrowing the terminology from digital applications, by “positive
edge-triggering” we mean the time instants at which the DoS exhibits
a transition from, say, zero (communication is possible) to, say, one
(communication is interrupted). This, along with τn > 0, implies
that hn+1 > hn for all n ∈ N.
zero during DoS intervals (Gupta et al., 2010). As will
become clear in the following, the latter can be regarded as
a simplified variant of the framework in which, upon DoS,
the process input is based on the most recently received
control signal. ✷
2.1 Problem overview
To begin with, it is convenient to introduce the following
definition.
Definition 1. Consider the control system Σ composed of
(1) under a state-feedback control as in (6). Σ is said
to be globally exponentially stable (GES) if there exist
α, β ∈ R>0 such that
‖x(t)‖ ≤ αe−βt‖x(0)‖ (7)
for all t ∈ R≥0 and for all x(0) ∈ R
nx , where ‖ · ‖ stands
for Euclidean norm. ✷
Various approaches have been considered assuring GES
to the control system in the absence of DoS; e.g., see
Heemels et al. (2012) for recent results and a discussion on
questions related to periodic vs aperiodic implementations.
A natural question then arises on whether mechanisms do
exist that are capable of preserving GES for certain DoS
signals.
In this respect, some preliminary considerations are in
order. Whatever the rule generating the {tk}-sequence,
ultimate goal of the “Logic” block is to update the control
action frequently enough so that stability is not destroyed.
While in principle this is always possible in the absence
of DoS 3 , the same conclusions do not hold if DoS
is allowed to be arbitrary. For instance, for open-loop
unstable systems, one immediately sees that if τ0 = ∞
then stability is lost irrespective of how {tk} is chosen.
These points motivate the following restriction on the
admissible DoS signals considered throughout the paper.
Given a sequence {hn}, let
Ξ(t) =


n(t)−1⋃
n=0
Hn


⋃ [
hn(t),min{hn(t) + τn(t); t}
]
(8)
denote the sum of DoS intervals up to the current time,
and, given an interval I, let |I| denote its length.
Assumption 1. The DoS sequence {hn}, n ∈ N, is such
that infn∈N τn > 0. Moreover, there exist constants κ ∈
R≥0 and τ ∈ R>0 such that
|Ξ(t)| ≤ κ+
t
τ
(9)
for all t ∈ R≥0. ✷
Remark 2. Condition infn∈N τn > 0 ensures that {hn} is
sufficiently “regular”. In particular, it implies that {hn}
is non-Zeno and that an infinite number of DoS intervals
does always have strictly positive Lebesgue measure. In-
equality (9) expresses the property that the DoS satisfies
3 In the absence of DoS, (6) reduces to (2). Then, assuming sufficient
computational resources, stability can always be ensured by choosing
{tk} in such a way that the inter-sampling times are small enough.
a slow-on-the-average type condition, as introduced by
Hespanha and Morse (1999) for hybrid systems analysis.
In the present context, the rationale behind (9) is that if
κ = 0 then the average time interval of DoS is at least τ .
On the other hand, κ > 0 allows for consideration of DoS
at the process start-up, i.e. when h0 = 0. ✷
Remark 3. The considered framework differs from clas-
sical networked systems where information loss can be,
for instance, assumed to follow some suitable stochastic
distribution; e.g., see Schenato et al. (2007). In fact, con-
cepts such as DoS, cyber-physical security/resilience are
mainly oriented towards scenarios where communication
loss can result from threats of a malicious nature. This is
the primary motivation for not assuming {hn} to follow a
specific distribution or pattern. ✷
3. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, a simple control update rule is considered,
which is capable of preserving GES for any DoS signal
satisfying Assumption 1 with τ sufficiently large. A dis-
cussion on the results along with implementation aspects
is deferred to the next section.
Let
e(t) := x(tk(t))− x(t) (10)
where t ∈ R≥0, represent the error between the value of the
process state at the last successful control update and the
value of the process state at the current time. Consistent
with the comments made right after (6), if h0 = 0 then
e(t) = −x(t) for all t ∈ H0. The closed-loop system
composed of (1) and (6) can be therefore rewritten as
x˙(t) = Φx(t) +BKe(t) (11)
where Φ := A + BK. Consider now the following control
update rule
‖e(t)‖ ≤ σ‖x(t)‖, ∀ t /∈ Ξ(t) (12)
where σ ∈ R>0 is a free design parameter. As shown
hereafter, such an update rule is capable of preserving
GES for any DoS signal satisfying Assumption 1 with τ
sufficiently large.
Condition (12) was first introduced in Tabuada (2007) in
the context of event-based control. The difference here is
that, due to the presence of DoS, one cannot enforce this
condition for all t ≥ 0, but only over those time-intervals
where communication is indeed possible.
To fix the ideas, it is convenient to briefly comment on
a possible implementation of condition (12), referring the
interested reader to Section 4 for a thorough discussion
and possible variations. The simplest architecture one can
think of for implementing (12) is that depicted in Figure
2(a). The “Logic” block measures continuously the state
x, computes the error signal e and detects the instants
tk at which (12) holds with the equality relation. At
these instants, the logic samples the state and attempt
to transmit it to the controller. In accordance with (10),
if the control update is successful then e is reset to zero.
If instead an acknowledgment is not received, then the
logic infers that the packet is lost, that is, tk ∈ Hn for
some n ∈ N. Under such circumstances, the logic turns to
a different operating mode by continuously attempting to
update the control action, as depicted in Figure 2(b). In
this way, at time hn+ τn when communication is restored,
the logic is able to transmit immediately the sampled
measurement so that (12) is enforced.
In the following subsection, for simplicity of exposition,
we assume that this is indeed the case. In practice, when
implementing (12) on a digital platform, due to the finite
sampling rate, a time interval will necessarily elapse from
the time hn + τn at which DoS is over, to the time at
which the logic successfully samples and transmits. As
anticipated, this case will be addressed in full details in
Section 4.
3.1 Stability analysis
We now study the trajectories of the closed-loop system
composed of (1) and (6) with control update law (12).
An alternative approach to stability analysis, based on
Lyapunov functions, is discussed in Appendix A.
Observe first that Φ is a stability matrix by hypothesis.
Then there exist µ ∈ R≥1 and λ ∈ R>0 such that
‖eΦt‖ ≤ µe−λt for all t ∈ R≥0, where µ and λ can be
easily computed using algebraic matrix theory. This, in
turns, implies
‖x(t)‖ ≤ ω1e
−λt +
∫
Θ(t)
ω2 e
−λ(t−s)‖e(s)‖ds
+
∫
Ξ(t)
ω2 e
−λ(t−s)‖e(s)‖ds (13)
having defined Θ(t) := [0, t)\Ξ(t), ω1 := µ‖x(0)‖ and
ω2 := µ‖BK‖ where, given a matrix M , ‖M‖ denotes
its spectral norm. We now evaluate the integral terms of
the above formula separately.
Consider first the interval Θ(t), over which (12) holds
by construction. The corresponding integral term can be
therefore upper bounded as
∫
Θ(t)
ω2 e
−λ(t−s)‖e(s)‖ds ≤
t∫
0
ω3 e
−λ(t−s)‖x(s)‖ds (14)
where ω3 := σω2.
Consider next Ξ(t). In this case, some intermediate steps
are needed. To begin with, we avail ourselves of the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. Consider the system Σ composed of (1) under
a state-feedback control as in (6) with control update rule
(12). Then
‖x(tk(hn))‖ ≤ (1 + σ)‖x(hn)‖ (15)
for all n ∈ N. ✷
Consider the n-th DoS interval Hn. Over each Hn, the
process dynamics are governed by
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +BKx(tk(hn)) (16)
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Fig. 2. Ideal mechanism for the fulfillment of (12): (a)
absence of DoS; (b) presence of DoS.
In addition, there exist θ ∈ R≥1 and ρ ∈ R≥0 such that
‖eAt‖ ≤ θeρt for all t ∈ R≥0
4 . Using (15) and (16),
it is then straightforward to verify that, over each DoS
interval, the solution to the closed-loop dynamics can be
upper bounded as
‖x(t)‖ ≤ θeρ(t−hn)‖x(hn)‖+
t∫
hn
θeρ(t−ζ)‖BK‖‖x(tk(hn))‖dζ
≤ θeρ(t−hn)‖x(hn)‖+
t∫
hn
θ1e
ρ(t−ζ)‖x(hn)‖dζ
≤ θ2e
ρ(t−hn)‖x(hn)‖ (18)
having defined θ1 =: θ(1 + σ)‖BK‖ and θ2 =: θ + θ1/ρ.
Recalling the definition of Ξ(t), let
τn(t) := min{τn, t− hn} (19)
denote the length of the last DoS interval up to time t. In
(13), the contribution to the evolution of the state by each
DoS interval can be upper bounded as follows
hn+τn(t)∫
hn
ω2 e
−λ(t−s)‖e(s)‖ds
=
hn+τn(t)∫
hn
ω2 e
−λ(t−s)‖x(tk(hn))− x(s)‖ds
≤
hn+τn(t)∫
hn
ω2 e
−λ(t−s)
[
‖x(tk(hn))‖ + ‖x(s)‖
]
ds
4 Alternatively, to possibly achieve tighter bounds, one can make
use of the logarithmic norm of a matrix M , which is defined as
ρM := max
{
ρ| ρ ∈ spectrum
{
(M +M⊤)/2
}}
(17)
where M⊤ is the transpose of M . In such a case, one has the bound
‖eAt‖ ≤ eρAt for all t ∈ R≥0 (Strom, 1975).
≤hn+τn(t)∫
hn
ω4 e
−λ(t−s) eρ(s−hn) ‖x(hn)‖ds
= ω∗(ρ) e
−λ(t−hn)
[
e(λ+ρ)τn(t) − 1
]
‖x(hn)‖ (20)
for all n ∈ N with n ≤ n(t), where the second inequality
follows from (15) and (18) with ω4 =: ω2(1 + σ) + ω2θ2;
the last equality holds by letting ω∗(ρ) =: ω4/(λ+ ρ).
Notice that by increasing ρ if necessary one can always
assume that (20) holds with ω∗(ρ) ≤ 1. Specifically, let
ρ be any positive scalar such that ‖eAt‖ ≤ θeρt for all
t ∈ R≥0 with θ ∈ R≥1. Then, by letting
ρ∗ := inf {ζ ∈ R≥ρ | ω∗(ζ) ≤ 1} (21)
δn(t) := e
(λ+ρ∗)τn(t) − 1 (22)
one can always rewrite (20) as
hn+τn(t)∫
hn
ω2 e
−λ(t−s)‖e(s)‖ds ≤ δn(t)e
−λ(t−hn)‖x(hn)‖
(23)
Hence, the last integral term of (13) can be finally upper
bounded as
∫
Ξ(t)
ω2 e
−λ(t−s)‖e(s)‖ds ≤
n(t)∑
n=0
δn(t)e
−λ(t−hn)‖x(hn)‖
(24)
Combining (13), (14) and (24), the following results can
be established.
Theorem 1. Consider the system Σ composed of (1) under
a state-feedback control as in (6). Let Φ = A + BK,
with µ ∈ R≥1 and λ ∈ R>0 positive constants satisfying
‖eΦt‖ ≤ µe−λt for all t ∈ R≥0. Let the control update rule
satisfy (12) with
λ− σµ‖BK‖ > 0 (25)
Then, Σ is GES for any DoS sequence {hn} satisfying
Assumption 1 with
τ >
λ+ ρ∗
λ− σµ‖BK‖
(26)
where ρ∗ is as in (21). In particular, under the stated
conditions, (7) holds true with constants α = µeκ(λ+ρ∗)
and β = λ− σµ‖BK‖ − (λ+ ρ∗)/τ . ✷
Remark 4. The constraint (25) must be satisfied even in
the absence of DoS. It reflects the fact that, even when
communication is always possible, in order to achieve
stability, the control action must be updated frequently
enough. On the other hand, (32) imposes constraints on
the admissible DoS signals. In this respect, notice that in
contrast with hybrid system analysis where τ is allowed to
take on values less than one, here τ must always be greater
than one. Such a constraint is consistent with intuition,
reflecting the fact that, to achieve stability, the total length
of DoS intervals must be a suitable fraction of the time (in
fact, |Ξ(t)| ≤ t/τ when κ = 0). ✷
Remark 5. At the expense of possibly larger overshoots
and more frequent control updates, one can always design
the control system so as to tolerate any DoS signal not
exceeding a prescribed fraction of time. Specifically, for
any given τ¯ > 1, one can always design K yielding a
nominal decaying rate λ large enough for the right hand
side of (32) to be strictly less than τ¯ . While this will
possibly result in a large value of µ‖BK‖, condition (25)
can be still satisfied by properly selecting σ. ✷
4. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESILIENT CONTROL
LOGICS
The analysis of Section 3 hinges upon the fulfillment of
condition (12). Such a condition cannot be directly imple-
mented on digital platforms in that, in order to be fulfilled,
it would require continuous transmission attempts upon
DoS detection, i.e. an infinite sampling rate. Motivated by
this, we first discuss how Theorem 1 can be generalized so
as to possibly account for finite sampling rate constraints.
Building upon Theorem 1, we finally consider a number
of implementation possibilities that can be used to trade-
off performance vs. communication resources within the
proposed framework.
4.1 Stability under finite sampling rate
We first consider the following definition.
Definition 2. A control update sequence {tk} is said to
occur at a finite sampling rate if there exist an ε ∈ R>0
such that
∆k := tk+1 − tk ≥ ε (27)
for all k ∈ N. ✷
Consider now a control update sequence {tk} along with
a DoS sequence {hn}, and let
Sn := {k ∈ N | tk ∈ Hn} (28)
denote the set of integers associated with an attempt
to update the control action during Hn. Accordingly, by
defining
∆Sn := sup
k∈Sn
∆k (29)
then
H¯n := [hn, hn + τn +∆Sn [ (30)
will provide an upper bound on the n-th time interval over
which the control action is not updated, while
Ξ¯(t) :=


n(t)−1⋃
n=0
H¯n


⋃
[
hn(t),min{hn(t) + τn(t) +∆Sn(t) ; t}
]
(31)
will provide an upper bound on the total interval up to the
current time over which the control action is not updated.
Equation (30) essentially models the additional delay in
the control update that may arise under finite sampling
rate. In fact, under (27), ∆Sn will be greater than or
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Fig. 3. Two DoS sequences (in dashed line) of equal total
length. The one at the top, composed of more intervals
having smaller duration, denies more communications
attempts than the one at the bottom.
equal to ε so that |H¯n| will be strictly greater than |Hn|.
Notice that (30) is non-conservative in the sense H¯n may
be exactly equivalent to the n-th time interval over which
the control action is not updated. One may in fact have
situations where a control update is requested just before
the time hn + τn at which the n-th DoS interval is over
and the next sampling time is scheduled at hn+ τn+∆Sn .
Such a case cannot be ruled out being hn and τn unknown.
With this definition in place, the following result can be
stated which extends the conclusions of Theorem 1 to
control update sequences possibly occurring at a finite
sampling rate. To avoid confusion, it is worth pointing out
that the result which follows is only concerned with the
effects of lower bounding {∆k} upon communication loss.
Logics satisfying the conditions of Theorem 2 with explicit
lower and upper bounds for ∆∗ are discussed in the next
subsection.
Theorem 2. Consider the system Σ composed of (1) under
a state-feedback control as in (6). Let Φ = A + BK,
with µ ∈ R≥1 and λ ∈ R>0 positive constants satisfying
‖eΦt‖ ≤ µe−λt for all t ∈ R≥0. Let the control update rule
satisfy (12) with Ξ(t) replaced by Ξ¯(t), where σ is as in
(25). Then, Σ is GES for any DoS sequence {hn} satisfying
Assumption 1 with
τ >
(
λ+ ρ∗
λ− σµ‖BK‖
)(
1 +
∆∗
τ∗
)
(32)
where
∆∗ := sup
n∈N
∆Sn (33)
and
τ∗ := inf
n∈N
τn (34)
In particular, under the stated conditions, (7) holds true
with constants α = µe(λ+ρ∗)(1+∆∗/τ∗)κ and β = λ −
σµ‖BK‖ − (λ+ ρ∗)(1 + ∆∗/τ∗)/τ . ✷
Remark 6. Theorem 2 differs from Theorem 1 not only
because of ∆∗ but also due to the presence of τ∗. This has
a very intuitive explanation. In fact, in the ideal case con-
sidered in Theorem 1, ∆∗ = 0 since a control update can
always occur as soon as DoS is over. Under finite sampling
rate, each DoS interval will instead possibly introduce an
additional delay in the control update. Accordingly, given
two DoS sequences of equal total length, the one composed
of more intervals having smaller duration will be more
critical for stability, since it will potentially deny more
communications attempts, as depicted in Figure 3. This
can also be seen from (32): the smaller τ∗, the larger the
value of τ required to achieve stability. ✷
4.2 Implementation and resilient control logics
The framework introduced with Theorem 2 is flexible
enough so as to allow the designer to choose from several
implementation options, some of which are described in
the following. Although these solutions originate from fun-
damentally different approaches, they exhibit the common
feature of resilience, by which we mean not only to ensure
a certain degree of robustness against DoS, but also the
ability to counteract it by changing the control update rule
upon communication loss.
Event/Time-driven logics. As discussed in Section 3, the
simplest architecture one can think of consists in using
a“Logic” block that measures continuously the state x,
computes the error signal e and detects the instants
(events) at which
‖e(t)‖ = σ‖x(t)‖ (35)
At these instants, the logic samples the process state and
attempt to transmit it to the controller. If an acknowl-
edgment is not received, the logic turns to a different
operating mode and attempts to update the control action
periodically 5 .
This is formalized in the next result.
Proposition 1. Let ∆1 be a positive scalar less than or
equal to ∆2, with ∆2 given by φ(∆2) = σ, the latter
being the unique solution at ∆2 of the generalized scalar
Riccati equation
φ˙(t) = ‖Φ‖+ (‖Φ‖+ ‖BK‖)φ(t) + ‖BK‖φ2(t) (36)
initialized at φ(0) = 0, where Φ = A + BK. Then, the
control update rule
tk+1 =


tk +∆1, if tk ∈ Hn(t)
orx(tk) = 0
inf { t ∈ R>tk :
‖e(t)‖ = σ‖x(t)‖ } , otherwise
(37)
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2 with ∆∗ = ∆1 and
∆k ≥ ∆1 for all k ∈ N. ✷
Purely time-driven logics. The rationale behind (37) is
that, upon DoS detection, transmission is attempted at
the sampling rate specified by ∆1, while, in the absence
of DoS, less frequent control updates are allowed. This
mechanism has the positive feature of potentially saving
communication resources but requires continuous process
state monitoring. Unless dedicated hardware is available
for this purpose, it is convenient to search for purely time-
driven logics in which the “Logic” block is embedded in
the control unit, as depicted in Figure 4.
5 A periodic update is also enforced when x(tk)=0. This is because
application of the second of (37) for x(tk)=0 would result in a
continuous control update.
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Fig. 4. Implementation for time-driven and self-triggering
policies with the “Logic” block embedded in the
control unit.
One possible solution is captured in the next result, whose
proof follows directly from Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Let ∆1 and ∆2 be positive scalars with
∆1 ≤ ∆2 and ∆2 as in Proposition 1. Then, the control
update rule
tk+1 =
{
tk +∆1, if tk ∈ Hn(t)
tk +∆2, otherwise
(38)
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2 with ∆∗ = ∆1 and
∆k ≥ ∆1 for all k ∈ N. ✷
Self-triggering logics. As a final possibility, we note that
purely time-driven logics can be relaxed to more flexible
aperiodic implementations by letting ∆k to take values
based on the available data. Logics of this kind are
typically referred to as “self-triggering” in that the next
update instant is computed directly by the control unit.
Let t1, t2 ∈ R≥0 with t2 ≥ t1 ≥ 0 and define
χ(t2, t1) :=

 eΦ(t2−t1) +
t2∫
t1
eΦ(t2−s)BKds

x(t1) (39)
Thus χ(tk, tk(t)) provides a prediction of x(tk) based on
the last successful measurement x(tk(t)). Thus, one can
set ∆k depending on the magnitude of ‖χ(tk, tk(t))‖: the
larger ‖χ(tk, tk(t))‖ the smaller ∆k and viceversa, which
corresponds to increasing the sampling rate as the distance
of the process state from the origin gets larger.
Then the next result holds, which follows again from
Proposition 1 6 .
Proposition 3. Let ∆1 and ∆2 be positive scalars with
∆1 ≤ ∆2 and ∆2 as in Proposition 1. Let ϕ : R≥0 7→ [0, 1],
be a class K function. Then, the control update rule
tk+1 = tk +∆2 − (∆2 −∆1)ϕ
(∥∥χ(tk, tk(t))∥∥) (40)
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2 with ∆∗ = ∆1 and
∆k ≥ ∆1 for all k ∈ N. ✷
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied resilient control strategies for linear sys-
tems under DoS. We have shown that to conclude asymp-
totic stability, DoS signals must not be active for more
than a certain percentage of time on the average. The
6 A function ϕ : R≥0 7→ R≥0, is said to be of class K if it is
continuous, strictly increasing and ϕ(0) = 0.
resilient nature of the proposed control strategy descends
from its ability to adapt the sampling rate to the state of
the process and to the occurrence of DoS attacks. The re-
sults lend themselves to be extended in various directions.
We have not investigated the effect of possible limitations
on the information, such as disturbances, quantization and
delays, and leave the topic for future investigation. As
additional future research topics, we envision the use of
similar techniques to handle the problem in the presence of
output feedback and for nonlinear systems. Regarding the
latter extension, the alternative Lyapunov-based analysis
of the problem presented in Appendix A suits well our
purpose. One of the motivation to consider control prob-
lems over networks descends from problems of distributed
coordination and control of large-scale systems. Investigat-
ing our approach to resilient control under DoS for event-
based coordination problems such as those in De Persis
and Frasca (2013) represents another interesting research
venue.
APPENDIX
Appendix A. LYAPUNOV-BASED APPROACH
Lyapunov arguments provide an alternative analysis of the
problem that is sometimes useful. Unless otherwise stated,
the notation for this section is the same as in Section 3.
Consider again the control system composed of (1) under
a state-feedback control as in (6) with control update
rule (12). Given any positive definite matrix Q = Q⊤ ∈
Rnx×nx , let P be the unique solution of the Lyapunov
equation
Φ⊤P + P Φ +Q = 0 (A.1)
Then, by taking V (x) = x⊤Px as a Lyapunov function,
and computing it along the solution to (11), it is immediate
to see that
α1‖x(t)‖
2 ≤ V (x(t)) ≤ α2‖x(t)‖
2 (A.2)
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ −γ1‖x(t)‖
2 + γ2‖x(t)‖‖e(t)‖ (A.3)
hold for all t ∈ R≥0, with α1 and α2 equal to the smallest
and largest eigenvalue of P , respectively, γ1 equal to the
smallest eigenvalue of Q, and γ2 := ‖K
⊤B⊤P + PBK‖
(cf. Tabuada (2007)).
Consider first Θ(t) = [0, t)\Ξ(t), over which (12) holds by
construction. In this case, simple calculations yield
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ −ω1V (x(t)) (A.4)
where ω1 := (γ1 − γ2σ)/α2.
Consider next Ξ(t). In this case, as before, some interme-
diate steps are needed. Consider the n-th DoS interval Hn.
From Lemma 1 we have
‖e(t)‖ = ‖x(tk(hn))− x(t)‖
≤ (1 + σ)‖x(hn)‖+ ‖x(t)‖ (A.5)
for all t ∈ Hn.
Thus, for all t ∈ Hn such that ‖x(hn)‖ ≤ ‖x(t)‖, one has
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ −γ1‖x(t)‖
2 + γ2(2 + σ)‖x(t)‖
2
< ω2V (x(t)) (A.6)
where ω2 := γ2(2 + σ)/α1. Conversely, for all t ∈ Hn such
that ‖x(hn)‖ > ‖x(t)‖, one has
V˙ (x(t)) < ω2V (x(hn)) (A.7)
Combining the last two inequalities with (A.4), the follow-
ing result can be established.
Theorem 3. Consider the system Σ composed of (1) under
a state-feedback control as in (6). Given any positive
definite matrix Q = Q⊤ ∈ Rnx×nx , let P be the unique
solution of the Lyapunov equation Φ⊤P + P Φ + Q = 0
with Φ = A+BK. Let V (x) = x⊤Px, and let the control
update parameter σ in (12) be such that
γ1 − σγ2 > 0 (A.8)
with γ1 and γ2 as in (A.3). Then, Σ is GES for any DoS
sequence {hn} satisfying Assumption 1 with
τ >
ω1 + ω2
ω1
(A.9)
where ω1 = (γ1 − γ2σ)/α2 and ω2 = γ2(2 + σ)/α1,
and α1 and α2 as in (A.2). In particular, under the
stated conditions, (7) holds true with constants α =√
eκ(ω1+ω2)α2/α1 and β = [ω1 − (ω1 + ω2)/τ ]/2.
Proof. For notational convenience, let h−1 = τ−1 := 0.
From (A.4) we have
V (x(t)) ≤ e−ω1(t−hn−1−τn−1)V (x(hn−1 + τn−1))(A.10)
for all t ∈ [hn−1+ τn−1, hn[ with n ∈ N. In addition, (A.6)
and (A.7) imply
V (x(t)) ≤ eω2(t−hn)V (x(hn)) (A.11)
for all t ∈ Hn with n ∈ N.
Combining the last two expressions and recalling the
definitions of Θ(t) and Ξ(t), we get
V (x(t)) ≤ e−ω1|Θ(t)| eω2 |Ξ(t)| V (x(0))
= e−ω1t e(ω1+ω2) |Ξ(t)| V (x(0))
= eκ(ω1+ω2) e−[ω1−(ω1+ω2)/τ ] t V (x(0))(A.12)
where the first equality follows since |Θ(t)| = t − |Ξ(t)|.
This establishes GES under the standing assumptions of
the theorem. As for the computation of the constants, it is
sufficient to observe that (A.12), along with (A.2), implies
‖x(t)‖2 ≤
α2
α1
eκ(ω1+ω2) e−[ω1−(ω1+ω2)/τ ] t ‖x(0)‖2(A.13)
which yields the desired result. 
Appendix B. PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1. If h0 = 0, then x(tk(h0)) = 0 by
definition so that (15) is valid. Recall next that
e(t) = x(tk(hn))− x(t) (B.1)
for all t ∈ Hn, n ∈ N, with x(tk(hn)) representing the
value of the process state at the last successful control
update before Hn. Since (12) holds true for all t /∈ Ξ(t)
and by continuity of x(·), one has ‖e(hn)‖ ≤ σ‖x(hn)‖
when h0 > 0 and for all n ∈ N1. Hence,
‖x(tk(hn))− x(hn)‖ ≤ σ‖x(hn)‖ (B.2)
and (15) follows by applying the triangular inequality. 
The proof of Theorem 1 rests on the following result, which
is a simplified variant of the Gronwall type inequality for
piecewise continuous functions considered in (Bainov and
Simeonov, 1992, Theorem 16.4).
Lemma 2. Let {ℓk}, k ∈ N, be a fixed sequence satisfying
0 ≤ ℓ0 < ℓ1 < ℓ2 < . . . and limk→∞ ℓk =∞. Suppose that
for t ≥ ℓ0 we have
ξ(t) ≤ ω1(t) +
t∫
ℓ0
ω2 ξ(s)ds+
∑
k∈N1: ℓ0<ℓk<t
δk(t) ξ(ℓk)
(B.3)
where ξ : R≥0 7→ R>0 is continuous; ω1 : R≥0 7→ R>0 is
a nondecreasing function in R≥0; ω2 ∈ R≥0 is a constant;
and δk(t) ∈ R≥0 with k ∈ N1 are nondecreasing functions
in R≥0. Then
ξ(t) ≤ ω1 e
ω2 (t−ℓ0)
∏
k∈N1: ℓ0<ℓk<t
(1 + δk(t)) (B.4)
for all t ≥ ℓ0. ✷
When δk(t) = 0 for all t ∈ R≥0 then (B.3) and (B.4) give
rise to the standard Gronwall-Bellman inequality (Bainov
and Simeonov, 1992, Theorem 1.1).
The idea is then to apply Lemma 2 to the inequality
obtained from the combination of (13), (14) and (24), with
ξ(·) and {ℓk} changed into ‖x(·)‖ and {hn}, respectively,
using the latter to model discontinuities in the process
behavior caused by DoS.
Proof of Theorem 1. Define
ξ(t) := eλt‖x(t)‖ (B.5)
Thus, using (14) and (24), one can rewrite (13) as
ξ(t) ≤ ω1 +
t∫
0
ω3 ξ(s)ds+
n(t)∑
n=0
δn(t)ξ(hn) (B.6)
Assume first h0 > 0. The conditions of Lemma 2 are
satisfied by letting ℓ0 = 0 and ℓn+1 = hn for all n ∈ N,
with δn(t) nondecreasing in R≥0 by construction. Thus
ξ(t) ≤ ω1 e
ω3 t
n(t)∏
n=0
e(λ+ρ∗)τn(t)
= µ ξ(0) eσµ‖BK‖ t e(λ+ρ∗)|Ξ(t)| (B.7)
for all t ∈ R≥0. Replacing in the inequality above the
expressions of the various variables and parameters, one
obtains
‖ξ(t)‖ ≤ µ‖x(0)‖ e(λ+ρ∗)κ e−(λ−σ‖BK‖−
λ+ρ∗
τ
)t (B.8)
This yields the desired result. Assume next h0 = 0.
Recalling that ω1 = µ ξ(0), one can rewrite (B.6) as
ξ(t) ≤ (µ+ δ0(t))ξ(0) +
t∫
0
ω3 ξ(s)ds+
n(t)∑
n=1
δn(t)ξ(hn)
(B.9)
Since µ ∈ R≥1, we have µ+δ0(t) ≤ µe
(λ+ρ∗)τ0(t), with τ0(t)
nondecreasing in R≥0 by construction. Thus, by applying
Lemma 2 with ℓn = hn for all n ∈ N1, we obtain again
(B.7). 
Proof of Theorem 2. By definition of Ξ¯(t), we get
|Ξ¯(t)| =
n(t)−1∑
n=0
(τn +∆Sn)
+ min{τn(t) +∆Sn(t) ; t− hn(t)} (B.10)
In addition,
|Ξ(t)| =
n(t)−1∑
n=0
τn +min{τn(t); t− hn(t)} (B.11)
If τn(t) > t−hn(t), then |Ξ(t)| ≥ n(t) τ∗. In turn, this yields
|Ξ¯(t)| = |Ξ(t)| +
n(t)−1∑
n=0
∆Sn
≤ |Ξ(t)| + n(t)∆∗ ≤ |Ξ(t)|
(
1 +
∆∗
τ∗
)
(B.12)
If instead τn(t) ≤ t−hn(t), then |Ξ(t)| ≥ (n(t)+1) τ∗. This
yields
|Ξ¯(t)| ≤ |Ξ(t)|+
n(t)∑
n=0
∆Sn
≤ |Ξ(t)|+ (n(t) + 1)∆∗ ≤ |Ξ(t)|
(
1 +
∆∗
τ∗
)
(B.13)
Thus, under Assumption 1,
|Ξ¯(t)| ≤
(
κ+
t
τ
)(
1 +
∆∗
τ∗
)
(B.14)
and the conclusion is that the proof of Theorem 1 carries
over to Theorem 2 with Ξ(t) and Θ(t) replaced by Ξ¯(t)
and Θ¯(t) := [0, t)\Ξ¯(t), respectively. 
Proof of Proposition 1. As shown in Tabuada (2007), in
the absence of DoS, the control update rule
tk+1 = inf { t ∈ R>tk : ‖e(t)‖ = σ‖x(t)‖ }
ensures that
‖e(t)‖ ≤ σ‖x(t)‖ (B.15)
for all t ∈ [tk, tk+1[ with ∆k ≥ ∆2. This also implies that,
in the absence of DoS, any periodic control update rule
tk+1 = tk + ∆1 with ∆1 ≤ ∆2 will still satisfy (B.15) for
all t ∈ [tk, tk+1[. With this in mind, consider a DoS interval
Hn. Then, two possible cases arise: if hn+1 ≤ hn+τn+∆1,
which means that H¯n and H¯n+1 overlap each other, there
is nothing to prove. If instead hn+1 > hn + τn + ∆1,
a successful control update will necessarily occur in the
interval [hn + τn, hn + τn + ∆1[. Since ∆1 ≤ ∆2, we
conclude that (37) satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2
with ∆∗ = ∆1 by construction. 
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